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NOTE
FOURTH AMENDMENT LIMITS ON
EXTENSIVE QUARANTINE
SURVEILLANCE
BENJAMIN WOLTERS

INTRODUCTION
Travelers to South Korea during the height of the COVID-19
pandemic faced stringent requirements as they set foot in the sterile
Seoul airport. Forced to self-quarantine for fourteen days, many
travelers acquiesced to do so under the government’s high-tech gaze—
downloading a smartphone application called Self-Quarantine Safety
Protection (English translation).1 The app used GPS technology to
track quarantined individuals’ movements around the clock.2
Individuals who strayed from their designated quarantine locations
could be forced by law to wear tracking wristbands,3 face heavy fines,
or serve up to a year in jail.4
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The COVID-19 pandemic will almost certainly not be the last.5
When the next transmissible disease threatens the world, global leaders
may look to the relative successes of countries that heavily monitored
their citizens during the COVID-19 pandemic—like South Korea.6
Officials in the U.S., which has never implemented a monitoring
program similar to that of South Korea, may at some point consider
instituting similar extensive surveillance measures. Therefore, potential
constitutional issues posed by disease surveillance deserve ex ante
examination.
This Note analyzes how the Fourth Amendment should apply to
one subset of disease surveillance measures: digital surveillance
designed to enforce quarantines. This analysis is framed by a
hypothetical state-run quarantine surveillance program, presented in
Section I. In the program, the government would track personal
electronic devices to determine whether individuals left their homes in
violation of a valid quarantine order, subjecting violators to legal
penalties.
The modern Fourth Amendment doctrine and its historical
underpinnings suggest that such a surveillance program would only
pass constitutional muster if backed by probable cause.7 The Fourth
Amendment generally requires that before the government initiates a
search it has probable cause.8 To satisfy probable cause, the government
must have individualized suspicion—meaning, generally, reasonable
grounds to believe that searching here (say, this suspect’s house) is more
likely to be fruitful than searching anywhere (all other houses).9
Because of the individualized suspicion requirement intrinsic to the
korea/44485280CA49B6C2B7A15F289D4DEB8C.
5. Leading scientists have forecasted deadlier and more frequent disease outbreaks in the
near future. INTERNATIONAL PLATFORM ON BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES,
WORKSHOP
ON
BIODIVERSITY
AND
PANDEMICS,
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY,
https://ipbes.net/pandemics. Furthermore, three pandemics occurred in the twentieth century.
Edwin D. Kilbourne, Influenza Pandemics of the 20th Century, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES J. 9, 9 (2006).
6. See Henrik Pettersson, Byron Manley, Sergio Hernandez, Tracking Covid-19’s Global
Spread, CNN (May 6, 2021, 11:00 AM), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/health/coronavirusmaps-and-cases/ (showing that South Korea and Israel, two counties that took digital surveillance
measures to help stem COVID-19, at least initially fared far better than the United States in
deaths per capita).
7. See infra Section IV and Section V.
8. See Probable Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining probable
cause as “[a] reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime
or that a place contains specific items connected with a crime”).
9. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 366 (2003) (noting that probable cause “must be
particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized”).
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probable cause standard,10 broad concerns about disease spread—
something common to all Americans, not particularized to a few—
likely would not be sufficient to extensively surveil. Practically, this
means the government likely could not implement en masse quarantine
surveillance.11
Instead, absent significant doctrinal change,12 the Fourth
Amendment seems to permit only targeted quarantine surveillance.13
Before tracking an individual’s electronic device, the government
would likely need reasonable grounds to believe a person is infected or
reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed or plans to
commit a quarantine violation.14 In practice, law enforcement would
likely have to obtain a warrant before tracking individuals or, if
obtaining a warrant was too burdensome, track individuals under the
exigent circumstances doctrine.15
Section I of this Note presents a hypothetical state-run quarantine
surveillance program. Section II explores the relevance of originalism
and historical practice to this quarantine surveillance program. Section
III explains the current Fourth Amendment doctrine pertinent to the
program and concludes that the hypothetical program likely constitutes
a Fourth Amendment “search.” Section IV reasons that a suspicionless,
penalty-backed quarantine surveillance program is likely
unconstitutional, as the administrative search doctrine likely could not
sustain the program. Section V contends that probable cause could
support a quarantine surveillance program under certain
circumstances. Section VI discusses what courts would likely consider
when deciding whether a probable cause-based program is sufficiently
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.

10. Id.
11. Of course, there may be epidemiological and efficiency benefits to tracking broad swaths
of the population. But Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that without individualized
suspicion governmental interests in public health should give way to individual privacy interests.
12. In his dissent in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, Justice Jackson quipped, “[t]here is
danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will
convert the Constitution into a suicide pact.” 337 U.S. 1, 36 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). If a
pandemic deadlier than COVID-19 infected the global community, and if available surveillance
technology could save thousands or even millions of lives, the Court would likely adapt—not
sacrifice the nation for its probable cause doctrine. Courts might observe that the Fourth
Amendment’s “reasonableness” requirement seems designed for this adaptation. Therefore, this
Note is limited in its scope; it does address doomsday scenarios or the potential for immense
doctrinal change.
13. See infra Section V.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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I. SETTING THE STAGE: THE HYPOTHETICAL STATE-RUN
QUARANTINE SURVEILLANCE AND ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM
This section outlines how a state government might impose a valid
quarantine order and an accompanying monitoring scheme.16 The
following sections examine the scheme’s constitutionality.
This Note’s hypothetical program is based loosely on South Korea’s
COVID-19 response. The hypothetical program would be entirely
government-run17 and would monitor individuals who are legally
obliged to self-quarantine by tracking personal electronic devices, like
cellphones or smart watches. The program would either mandate the
installation of a tracking app or otherwise track the location of the
device, such as through GPS technology. Furthermore, legal penalties
for quarantine violators could include fines, small amounts of jail time,
or other reasonable criminal penalties.
Additionally, states, not the federal government, would implement
the hypothetical program. States have historically quarantined
individuals with some frequency.18 And, as the Supreme Court has
16. This framework is necessary to ground the analysis because quarantine surveillance
could take the various forms. The framework is, admittedly, both too restrictive and too openended. By the time another pandemic surfaces, the notion of quarantine and the many
complications associated with enforcing such quarantines may have changed. Moreover,
technology may have improved enough to render this framework anachronistic. The framework
also leaves open many important variables; for instance, as discussed in Section III, tweaking the
extent of the tracking under the surveillance program might significantly alter the Fourth
Amendment analysis. Still, the framework is a good estimate of current technological capabilities
and provides a necessary analytical starting point.
17. This entirely government-run problem would avoid any issues posed by the third-party
doctrine. The third-party doctrine provides that individuals have no reasonable expectation of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment when they voluntarily hand over information to a third
party, such as a bank or an email service provider. This means the government can generally
obtain this information with no warrant and only the consent of the third party. Therefore, a
quarantine surveillance program where the government partners with the private sector—a
possibility not addressed by this Note—might be shielded by the third-party doctrine.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) may have
signaled a partial retreat of the doctrine, as the Court determined that a Fourth Amendment
violation occurred when the government warrantlessly gathered an individual’s historical cell
phone location data from a cell service provider.
18. Josh Hicks, A Brief History of Quarantines in the United States, THE WASHINGTON POST
(Oct. 7, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2014/10/07/abrief-history-of-quarantines-in-the-united-states/ (noting several instances of states quarantining
individuals who were suspected to be infected with a dangerous disease); see HOWARD
MARKEL, QUARANTINE: EAST EUROPEAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS AND THE NEW
YORK CITY EPIDEMICS OF 1892, 46–59 (1997) (explaining how during the 1892 outbreak of
typhoid fever, New York City forcibly quarantined 1,200 people, mostly Eastern European Jewish
Immigrants, when the vast majority of such people—approximately 1,100—were not infected);
see also Givens v. Newsom, 459 F.Supp.3d 1302, 1310–17 (E.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d, 830 F. App’x 560
(9th Cir. 2020) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order on the California
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emphasized, states have police powers to design rational “quarantine
laws” and “health laws.”19 The federal government, lacking these police
powers, would face distinct constitutional issues in implementing
quarantine surveillance.20
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: TEXT AND RELEVANT HISTORY
Digital quarantine surveillance programs would likely face their
most potent challenges under the Fourth Amendment. The
amendment’s text provides that the government may not initiate
“unreasonable searches”21 against “persons” or their “houses, papers,
and effects.”22 The original understanding of the Fourth Amendment is
notoriously vague, including what constitutes a “search” and what
kinds of searches are “reasonable.”23 Yet history provides some clues
about original intent, particularly because the Fourth Amendment was
derived from similar provisions in several state constitutions.24
The Fourth Amendment is generally thought to have adopted the
holdings of two mid-late eighteenth-century Anglo-American cases:
Wilkes v. Wood and Entick v. Carrington.25 Both cases involved soGovernor’s executive order that, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, directed residents to “stay
home or at their place of residence except as needed,” with exceptions that permitted “necessary
shopping and certain kinds of work”).
19. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 8 (1824); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
20. States may be owed special deference regarding public health matters, as suggested by
the Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905). Also, quarantine surveillance
could raise novel issues under the Commerce Clause, and the anti-commandeering doctrine may
pose hurdles to federal implementation.
21. Quarantine monitoring likely does not invite a discussion of “seizures,” the other kind
of government activity contemplated in the Fourth Amendment.
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .
.”).
23. See Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT.
REV. 67, 71–72 (2013) (noting that the issue of what constitutes a search “rarely arose” in the
Founding era, leaving us with “little evidence” besides the examples of “physical entries into
homes, violent rummaging for incriminating items once inside, and then arrests and the taking
away of evidence found”); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1743–44 (2000) (arguing that the common law that supposedly underpins
the Fourth Amendment is sparse, vague, and contradictory); see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526
U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999) (Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, seemed to implicitly
acknowledge that originalism is not decisive in many Fourth Amendment cases, noting that,
“[w]here that inquiry [into the common law at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted]
yields no answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of
reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.”).
24. See Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, supra note 23, at 70–71.
25. See Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. 489 (KB); Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep.
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called “general warrants,” which gave English law enforcement broad
authority to raid colonists’ houses in search of anything related to
anonymous pamphlets criticizing the King.26 The courts in both cases
disapproved of this practice.27
The Fourth Amendment is also generally viewed as having
overturned certain English colonial practices. These practices include
the frequent use of “writs of assistance,” which gave British officials
broad license to forcibly enter American homes, without specific
warrants, whenever the homes were suspected to contain uncustomed
goods.28
These origins provide little guidance for dealing with the nuances
of many modern searches. The main historical takeaway—that searches
into the home generally require specific warrants—has already been
incorporated into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.29 Moreover, at
the time of the founding, common law concerning privacy rights was
sparse and vague, which complicates efforts to discern the Fourth
Amendment’s original meaning.30
Therefore, originalism has not played a central role in most of the
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 31 even as more
conservative justices have occupied the Court.32 The prevailing test for
determining whether a “search” has occurred tracks contemporary, not
originalist, intuitions about privacy.33 And the Supreme Court’s
standard articulation of Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” is not

807 (KB).
26. Wilkes 98 Eng. at 498; Entick 95 Eng. at 817–18.
27. Id.
28. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 55 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1937).
29. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 480 (1965) (“For we think it is clear that this warrant
was of a kind which it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to forbid—a general warrant.”).
30. See Sklansky, supra note 23, at 1743–44 (arguing that the common law that supposedly
underpins the Fourth Amendment is sparse, vague, and contradictory).
31. Originalism, as traditionally understood by academics, suggests that a law’s meaning
should not change much over time. See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism,
59 STANFORD L. REV. 551, 551 (2010) (noting that originalists generally interpret the law as based
on a relatively static view of common law at the time of a law’s enactment, then suggesting a more
adaptable “common law originalism”). As noted, some reconcile originalism with the Fourth
Amendment by arguing that the amendment was intended to change over time.
32. See Lawrence Rosenthal, An Empirical Inquiry into the Use of Originalism: Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence During the Career of Justice Scalia, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 75, 75 (2018)
(finding that less than 14 percent of the Court’s opinions addressing a disputed question of the
Fourth Amendment were decided on originalist grounds).
33. Sklansky, supra note 23, at 1739–40.
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grounded in original intent.34 Furthermore, prominent scholars have
reasoned that the Founders intended the “reasonableness” and
“search” elements of the Fourth Amendment to evolve over time,
especially to accommodate new technological developments.35 In short,
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has generally been flexible and
context-based.
Still, the Fourth Amendment’s historical background appears to
have slight—but noteworthy—bearing on the issue of digital
quarantine surveillance. First, judges could cite the famed “castle
doctrine,”36 which might justify heightened scrutiny of home
surveillance programs. Second, judges could cite the 1905 case Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, which might justify deference to state governments on
public health matters.37
A. The Castle Doctrine’s Relevance to Quarantine Surveillance
Though the Supreme Court has often disregarded history in
interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the old English maxim that “a
man’s house is his castle” remains relevant. The maxim has been
directly linked to the drafting of the Fourth Amendment.38 And
throughout American history courts have maintained a particularly
acute focus on privacy rights in the home.39 Before the emergence of
the modern Fourth Amendment doctrine, the Supreme Court often

34. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999) (noting that where an
originalist inquiry into the common law “yields no answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure
under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which
it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests).
35. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Challenge of Fourth Amendment Originalism and the Positive
Law Test, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 19, 2018, 6:39 AM) (arguing that originalist materials
are simply too sparse to devise a modern and operational Fourth Amendment doctrinal test).
36. D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 257
(2006) (noting that the castle doctrine originated at common law, gives special rights to selfdefense in one’s home, and are given special treatment in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
37. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 11 (1905).
38. First, the paradigmatic government searches that the Fourth Amendment is believed to
have responded to, in Wilkes and Entick, both involved home intrusions. Second, in 1761 James
Otis famously argued in court against the aforementioned “writs of assistance,” emphasizing that
such writs would remove the “freedom of one’s own house” and derogate the principle that a
“man’s house is his castle”; a young John Adams was inspired by Otis’s arguments and went on
to draft the Massachusetts Constitution, which became a model for the Fourth Amendment.
William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1821, 1837–38 (2016).
39. See Barros, Home as a Legal Concept supra note 36, at 257 (“Homes also are given
favored treatment in search and seizure law, and their importance to the Founders is reflected in
the language of the Fourth Amendment.”).
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determined what constituted a “search” by analogizing the activity at
hand to home searches.40 And in 1914, the Supreme Court recognized
that “a man’s house was his castle,” though not in the Fourth
Amendment’s text, was “enacted into the fundamental law in the 4th
Amendment.”41 In modern times, justices continue to cite the common
law maxim favorably.42
Therefore, some judges may be inclined to heavily scrutinize
quarantine surveillance programs that track individuals’ locations
within their homes. Although in the hypothetical program the
government would technically search electronic devices, the function
of the search would be to track whether an individual stays in or leaves
their home. History and original intent suggest such a program should
face greater judicial scrutiny than searches entirely outside of the
home.43
B. Historical Deference to Elected Officials on Public Health Issues
Nonetheless, some precedent suggests that courts should defer to
the decisions of elected officials on public health matters. In Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court upheld a Massachusetts law that
imposed a five-dollar fine on adults who refused to get vaccinated
during a smallpox outbreak.44 In reaching its conclusion, the Court
emphasized the principle of deference to the “police power[s] of a
state,” especially if states are acting to protect the “public health” or
passing “quarantine laws.”45 Additionally, the Court underscored that
sometimes individual liberties must give way to the “common good.”46
Although Jacobson’s holding has never been overturned, the
reasoning in Jacobson likely is not decisive on the issue of quarantine
surveillance. The opinion only briefly mentioned “quarantine laws” in
dictum. And the Court decided Jacobson sixty years before the
incorporation of the Fourth Amendment against the states,47 when the
40. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, supra note 23, at 68–69.
41. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914).
42. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The
people’s protection against unreasonable search and seizure in their ‘houses’ was drawn from the
English common-law maxim, ‘A man’s home is his castle.’”).
43. For instance, digital contact tracing programs—tracking the spread of disease between
people largely outside of the home—might be less scrutinized.
44. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905).
45. Id. at 25.
46. Id. at 26.
47. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the Fourth Amendment against the
states for the first time).
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Court had not yet developed modern tiers of scrutiny.
Jacobson’s legacy has, additionally, been tarnished. In the 1927 case
Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court infamously invoked Jacobson to
uphold a Virginia law that provided for the forced sterilization of
certain individuals, including those who were intellectually disabled.48
The Court reasoned that “[t]he principle that sustains compulsory
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the fallopian tubes.”49
More recently, the Supreme Court has suggested that Jacobson
should be strictly limited to its holding regarding compulsory
vaccinations. In particular, when the Supreme Court struck down
COVID-19 precautions that the Court said unfairly singled out
religious gatherings, it declined to apply the deferential standard of
Jacobson and instead applied strict scrutiny to the state-implemented
public health measures.50 In that decision, Justice Gorsuch declared
that Jacobson’s deferential standard should not apply when a
“fundamental right” is at stake.51 In another case, Justice Alito, joined
in dissent by Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh, reasoned that
“Jacobson must be read in context” as deciding a “challenge to a local
ordinance requiring residents to be vaccinated for small pox.”52 The trio
argued that “[i]t is a considerable stretch to read the decision as
establishing the test to be applied . . . [to] other provisions not at issue
in that case.”53 Notably, the Fourth Amendment was not explicitly at
issue in Jacobson.54
Because of the recent souring towards Jacobson, courts seem
unlikely to apply Jacobson-style deference in lieu of the standard
Fourth Amendment analysis. Nonetheless, the case may still hold some
sway: modern courts may take into account the central components of
the 1905 Court’s reasoning—that states have traditionally had wide
discretion over public health, and that courts should be hesitant to
interfere with public health policy—as considerations for determining
48. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
49. Id.
50. See Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020) (concluding
that the challenged restrictions were neither “neutral” nor of “general applicability” because of
their effect on churches and synagogues).
51. Id. at 70 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
52. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S.Ct. 2603, 2608 (2020) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
53. Id.
54. See generally Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (not discussing the Fourth
Amendment and instead addressing other constitutional provisions like the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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whether a search is sufficiently “reasonable” under Fourth
Amendment.55
In sum, two pieces of historical evidence point in opposite
directions. The common law mantra that “a man’s house is his castle”
suggests that surveillance related to an individual’s home is particularly
suspect, whereas the reasoning in Jacobson—although constricted in
more recent years—suggests some judicial deference to state
lawmakers on public health matters.
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE AND SURVEILLANCE AS A
“SEARCH”
A. The Modern Fourth Amendment Doctrine and its Pertinent
Exceptions
The government violates the Fourth Amendment if it performs a
“search” that is “unreasonable.” Both elements, under the modern
doctrine, involve an inquiry into reasonableness—the “touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment.”56
First, government intrusions constitute Fourth Amendment
“searches” if they either violate “reasonable expectation[s] of privacy”
under Katz v. United States, the Katz test,57 or constitute a trespass at
common law under United States v. Jones, the Jones test.58 In general,
the Supreme Court has broadly defined the array of government
intrusions that constitute “searches,” which range from rifling through
a suspect’s car to unlocking a suspect’s cell phone.59
Second, searches must be “reasonable.” Warrantless searches tend
to be unreasonable.60 Courts grant warrant requests only upon a
showing of probable cause and a determination that the proposed
search is otherwise reasonable.61
Still, the Supreme Court has declared that warrantless searches are
sometimes permissible if they fall within “a few specifically established

55. The interplay between Jacobson and the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness”
requirement is discussed in Section VII.
56. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
57. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
58. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012).
59. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (applying the search incident to arrest
doctrine to modern cell phones).
60. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010).
61. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring that warrants may only be issued upon “probable
cause” and that all searches not be “unreasonable”).
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and well-delineated exceptions to that general rule.”62 These so-called
“exceptions” have proliferated,63 sometimes with vague doctrinal tests
and uncertain applicability.64 Of the many exceptions, two would likely
be relevant in a court’s analysis of quarantine surveillance: the exigent
circumstances doctrine and the administrative search doctrine.65
The exigent circumstances doctrine applies when “the exigencies of
the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.”66 Such exigencies include pursuing a fleeing suspect,
rendering emergency aid to an individual suffering from a serious
injury, and intervening to prevent imminent destruction of evidence.67
For a warrantless search to satisfy the exigent circumstances
doctrine, it must be responsive to an “emergency”68 in which it is not
practical to secure a warrant.69 Courts will then assess the
reasonableness of the search, which is often determined by weighing
“the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy
[against] the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests,” such that the party with the
overriding interests will prevail.70
The second relevant exception to the warrant requirement, the
administrative search doctrine or “special needs” doctrine, generally
applies when the government searches large numbers of individuals
without having prior evidence that the individuals are guilty of any
wrongdoing.71 Administrative searches include screenings of travelers
by airport security, drug testing for public employment, and vehicle

62. Quon, 560 U.S. at 760.
63. Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth
Amendment, 44 VAND L. REV. 473, 481 n.43 (1991) (“There are no fewer than 12 (and perhaps
more than 15) exceptions to the warrant requirement.”).
64. Eve Brensike Primus, Bringing Clarity to the Administrative Search Doctrine:
Distinguishing Dragnets from Special Subpopulation Searches, 39 SEARCH AND SEIZURE L.
REP. 61, 61 (2012) (noting the current incoherence of the administrative search exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s general warrant requirement).
65. The third-party doctrine, supra note 17, would be relevant in a surveillance scheme that
involved both the government and the private sector, which is not discussed here.
66. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011).
67. Id.
68. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013).
69. Id.
70. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2176 (2016) (quoting Riley v. California, 573
U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).
71. See Primus, supra note 64, at 61 (noting the large scale of administrative searches and
that “the government conducts thousands of administrative searches every day”).
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checkpoints designed to curtail drunk driving.72
For a warrantless search to satisfy the administrative search
doctrine, it must serve “special governmental needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement.”73 Much like under the exigent
circumstances doctrine, courts will also assess reasonableness by
weighing the governmental interest in the search against individual
privacy interests.74
B. Quarantine Surveillance Likely Constitutes a Fourth Amendment
“Search”
The modern Fourth Amendment doctrine suggests that digital
disease surveillance, as contemplated by this Note, likely constitutes a
“search”—meaning it must be reasonable to be constitutional.
The Jones test provides that searches include “trespass[es] at
common law.”75 Forced installation of an app or other program on an
electronic device likely qualifies as an offense at common law called
“trespass to chattels.” The offense involves “direct physical
interference with a chattel possessed by another.”76 It initially only
applied to physical property, but courts have since applied it to
cyberspace.77
Furthermore, under the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy”
test, any location tracking to enforce quarantine—with or without an
app—likely constitutes a “search.” The Supreme Court held in
Carpenter v. United States that a “search” occurred when law
enforcement agents inspected cell-site location information records,
which allowed the agents to track the past movements of a suspect
based on location data.78 Location data gathered in quarantine
surveillance would likely be more precise and may track current, not
historical, movements—making an even more compelling case than
72. Id.
73. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989).
74. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829–34 (2002) (in a
case involving a search in the public school context—a context where the Court has previously
held that “special needs” doctrine applies—weighing individual interests in privacy against
governmental interests).
75. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012) (demonstrating that trespasses at
common law often constitute Fourth Amendment searches).
76. Trespass, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
77. Laura Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421, 421 (2002) (noting that trespass to chattels has been applied by courts
to, among other things, spam emails and “spiders” searching internet databases).
78. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
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Carpenter for a violation of reasonable expectations of privacy.
Nonetheless, state governments could ostensibly design tracking
programs that would strain the notion of a “search.” For instance, state
governments might develop an “extruder alert” that would notify
authorities when individuals left their property boundaries, yet
somehow prevented all other tracking information from reaching the
government. This would seem considerably less invasive than the
tracking at issue in Carpenter.
This hypothetical extruder alert turns on tighter constitutional
margins, but it still likely constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. Such
a program would be far from non-invasive, as it would precisely track
around the clock whether and when individuals left their homes. Courts
might also hesitate to rule that such an invasive use of technology is
non-justiciable under the Constitution, especially because courts have
been particularly sensitive to privacy invasions that involve the home.79
IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH DOCTRINE: A POOR FIT FOR
QUARANTINE SURVEILLANCE
The administrative search doctrine may seem like an attractive
foothold for government officials seeking to implement a quarantine
surveillance program. After all, the doctrine does not require the
government to obtain a warrant or make a showing of probable cause.80
And at least one scholar has argued that the administrative search
doctrine could likely accommodate a wide array of high-tech disease
surveillance programs.81 Nonetheless, the doctrine likely does not
support the quarantine surveillance program posited by this paper—
mainly because penalty-backed searches aimed at public health issues
likely fall within “the normal need for law enforcement.”
A. Quarantine Surveillance Primarily Serves a Law Enforcement
Purpose
The administrative search doctrine only applies in cases in which
the “primary purpose” of a search is “distinguishable from the general

79. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (noting that it matters that the trespass was upon the
“curtilage of a home,” not an “open field,” because the former category is specifically enumerated
in the Fourth Amendment).
80. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (establishing that
warrants and probable cause are not indispensable components of reasonableness).
81. Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Digital Disease Surveillance, 70 AM. U. L. REV. 101, 106 (2021).
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interest in crime control”82 or serves a governmental need “beyond the
normal need for law enforcement.”83
In determining what constitutes a “normal need for law
enforcement,” certain holdings are clear. The doctrine permits
otherwise reasonable searches with no law enforcement involvement.
For instance, public schools can routinely drug test students who
participate in extracurricular activities so long as schools do not
provide the test results to law enforcement.84 But the doctrine does not
permit searches that are inseparable from standard police activities. For
instance, police may not initiate suspicionless searches of every house
in a neighborhood for drug paraphernalia.
The Supreme Court has largely declined to elaborate on this
doctrinal test. It remains unclear how the doctrine applies when there
is some police involvement. For instance, sometimes the doctrine
permits collateral prosecutions, meaning prosecutions based on what
was uncovered in the search. The Court has allowed collateral
prosecutions of routinely drug-tested public employees,85 but it has
disallowed collateral prosecutions in other cases.86 As such, it is most
informative to focus on recent case law and trends in Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
In 2001, the Court signaled that the administrative search doctrine
does not permit collateral prosecutions to serve as “means to an end”
if the “end” is a public health purpose.87 The Court in Ferguson v. City
of Charleston reviewed a local policy that authorized hospitals to
provide law enforcement with the results of drug tests, such as tests for
cocaine, performed on pregnant women. The hospital would, without
these pregnant women’s consent, send the drug tests to local law
enforcement, upon which prosecutors could charge the women with

82. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000).
83. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
84. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825, 833 (2002); see also
Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (holding that a valid administrative search occurred
where the government monitored a police officer’s text messages, subjecting the officer to internal
discipline but not prosecution).
85. Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (holding that public rail
employees could be routinely drug tested by their employer and subject to prosecution based on
that evidence).
86. See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 412–13 (2015) (holding that certain
searches of hotel records were unconstitutional, and not protected under the administrative
search doctrine, because the search scheme permitted prosecution of a misdemeanor recordkeeping violation).
87. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001).
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drug crimes.88 The Court struck down the program because although
“the ultimate goal of the program may well have been to get the women
in question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs, the
immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law
enforcement purposes in order to reach that goal.”89
Any potential quarantine surveillance program would also
purportedly serve an ultimate public health goal. Penalty-backed
quarantine laws would, like the program in Ferguson, be a “means” to
an end; the “immediate objective” would be to penalize individuals
who broke quarantine.
Furthermore, the Court in Ferguson noted a difficult line-drawing
problem. Because enforcement of nearly every law serves a broader
public purpose, accepting the argument that public health justifies a
penalty-backed search would seem to immunize “virtually any
nonconsensual suspicionless search.”90 Every law—from homicide
statutes to jaywalking ordinances—can be framed as a “means” of
promoting public health and safety. By that token, categorizing
quarantine surveillance as an administrative search risks including an
unwieldy number of searches in that category.
Finally, the administrative search doctrine is in flux, and—perhaps
with an eye to the Ferguson court’s line-drawing argument—the
prevailing trend seems to be to narrow the scope of the searches the
doctrine covers. Early Supreme Court cases applied the administrative
search doctrine expansively, permitting collateral prosecutions in
several schemes.91 But since 200192 the Supreme Court has not issued a
single opinion upholding an administrative search scheme. Moreover,
in line with the Ferguson case, the Supreme Court again recently cut
back on the administrative search doctrine—declining to apply the
traditionally “more relaxed” review of administrative searches of
heavily regulated businesses to a law permitting certain hotel
inspections.93
88. Id. at 70–73.
89. Id. at 82–83.
90. Id. at 84.
91. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566–67 (1976) (holding that
suspicionless searches at checkpoints for undocumented immigrants were constitutional); see also
Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (holding that employee drug
testing without a warrant or reasonable suspicion was constitutional).
92. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002) (holding
that suspicionless drug testing of some students in extracurricular activities was constitutional).
93. See City of Los Angelos v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 412–13 (2015) (holding that certain
searches of hotel records were unconstitutional because noncompliance was considered a
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B. Administrative Searches Tend to Be Routine Responses to NonEmergency Scenarios
Administrative searches are aptly named: they tend to be routine,
mundane, “administrative” responses to persistent problems. These
searches include drug testing of public employees, routine firearm
inspections, and airport security checks.94 Such searches have become
regular responses to the ever-present societal problems posed by drugs,
guns, and terrorism. Furthermore, administrative searches tend to
continue perpetually rather than respond temporarily to time-bound
emergencies.
Quarantine surveillance, by contrast, would likely address the
unusual and fleeting emergency of disease spread. It would seem
“unreasonable” to permit perpetual government location tracking;
everyday Americans and courts alike would likely balk at quarantine
surveillance that amounted to more than a temporary fix.
C. The Administrative Search Doctrine is Too Vague and Inconsistent
to Justify Quarantine Surveillance
Furthermore, the administrative search doctrine is too vague and
contradictory for courts to apply it consistently to quarantine
surveillance. The Supreme Court has not elaborated much on the
“normal need for law enforcement” test. And the Court has applied the
test disparately: for instance, it has authorized suspicionless searches of
vehicles at checkpoints for undocumented immigrants,95 but it did not
allow suspicionless searches at highway checkpoints for drugs in
vehicles.96 Scholars, too, have repeatedly criticized the doctrine—
bemoaning its variability,97 incoherence,98 and lack of limiting
principles.99
The administrative search doctrine’s origins help explain its current
contradictions. The doctrine stemmed from two distinct strains of
suspicionless searches: searches involving “minimally intrusive
misdemeanor).
94. Primus, supra note 64, at 61, 63.
95. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566–67 (1976).
96. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
97. Primus, supra note 64, at 61.
98. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public,
1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 89 (noting the administrative search doctrine’s “doctrinal incoherence”).
99. See Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of
Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 407 n.76 (1988) (arguing that all searches outside of a
street crime setting could be justified under the Fourth Amendment).
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government actions” like checkpoint inspections for drunk driving, and
“searches of special subpopulations” like drug tests of probationers.100
Case law has commingled these two strains, leading to murky doctrine
and unpredictable results.101 Therefore, the administrative search
doctrine offers unsteady grounds on which lawmakers can justify a
quarantine surveillance program. Courts are likely to reason that such
an extensive search program merits a consistent approach, not
grounding in an unpredictable doctrine.
D. When the Administrative Search Doctrine May Apply
The administrative search doctrine may still justify quarantine
surveillance programs that do not subject violators to legal penalties.
This could conceivably take many forms. For instance, epidemiologists
might surveil quarantine breaches to predict where disease outbreaks
will occur, then design responsive public health programs. Or, more
colorfully, the government might institute a sort of name-and-shame
program by publishing the identities of quarantine violators on a public
forum. These surveillance programs without penalties could be
administrative searches, under the strict language of the doctrine,
because they are not in any way entangled with law enforcement.
Nonetheless, these quarantine surveillance programs might still
violate the Fourth Amendment. Courts would subject them to a
generalized “reasonableness” inquiry, balancing individual interests
against governmental interests.102 In the above-mentioned programs,
the individual privacy interests at stake in a would still be quite high, as
individuals would be constantly and invasively monitored. Moreover,
the governmental interest would be minimal in a program that does not
work, and enforcement-less programs might likely lack the coercive
power to be effective.
V. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WARRANTS, AND PROBABLE CAUSE:
JUSTIFYING TARGETED QUARANTINE SURVEILLANCE
Authorities could likely use a warrant program or the exigent
circumstances doctrine to justify quarantine surveillance. Importantly,

100. Primus, supra note 64, at 62–65.
101. Id. at 61.
102. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829–34 (2002) (in a
case involving a search in the public school context—a context where the Court has previously
held that “special needs” doctrine applies—weighing individual interests in privacy against
governmental interests).
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both exigent circumstances and warrants require probable cause—
meaning that before initiating quarantine surveillance authorities
would need some sort of evidence pertinent to the quarantined
individual. These searches would still be subject to a generalized
determination of whether the search program is “reasonable.”103
A. Emergency Disease Spread Can Rise to The Level of an “Exigent
Circumstance”
The exigent circumstances doctrine applies in urgent situations
when obtaining a warrant is impractical.104 Courts determine the
existence of a sufficient emergency by a loose, “totality of the
circumstances” test.105 Classic examples of exigent circumstances
include burning buildings and fleeing suspects.106
To make use of the exigent circumstances doctrine, it must be
impractical to obtain a warrant. For instance, the Supreme Court has
held that suspected drunk driving does not constitute a “per se
exigency” that permits police officers to require drivers to submit to a
blood test.107 In that case, the Court reasoned that it may be practical
for law enforcement officers to secure a warrant—especially over the
telephone—because alcohol in the bloodstream “naturally dissipates
over time in a gradual and relatively predictable manner.”108
Instances of rapid and dangerous disease spread, such as the
COVID-19 pandemic, are most naturally framed as emergencies. The
more difficult question is when it would become impractical for police
to obtain a warrant before initiating quarantine surveillance. In many
circumstances, especially if the number of infections is low, obtaining a
timely warrant may be possible. Perhaps there would be an expedited
process to approve quarantine surveillance warrants.
Still, obtaining warrants may become nearly impossible. If a disease
becomes widespread, the judicial system could become overrun with
warrant requests that would delay processing. Moreover, mere hourslong delays in issuing warrants could prove deadly, as individuals could
break quarantine and infect others in a short time. Therefore, if the
judicial system is unable to issue prompt warrants, the exigent
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See infra Section VII.
See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 153 (2013).
Id. at 145.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 153.
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circumstances doctrine should be available to fill in the gaps.
B. Probable Cause: A Requirement for Warrants and Exigent
Circumstances
Searches authorized by warrants or the exigent circumstances
doctrine require probable cause. Probable cause generally means
reasonable grounds—or “more than a bare suspicion”—”to suspect
that a person has committed or is committing a crime or that a place
contains specific items connected with a crime.”109 This standard
requires individualized suspicion—or evidence particular to an
individual—to initiate a search,110 not merely a generalized suspicion
that all Americans will violate quarantine restrictions.
Evidence that an individual has broken quarantine would likely
satisfy probable cause. Reasonable grounds to believe a past crime has
occurred, such as previously violating a quarantine law, fits squarely
within the definition of probable cause.111
Evidence of plans to violate quarantine is likely sufficient too. The
Supreme Court has held that reasonable suspicion of a future crime can
constitute probable cause—approving of “anticipatory” warrants
based on “probable cause that at some future time (but not presently)
certain evidence of a crime will be located at a specified place.’”112 This
evidence could potentially take a few different forms, such as evidence
that an individual has communicated plans to break quarantine.
Moreover, reasonable suspicion that an individual is infected with
the disease at issue would likely satisfy probable cause. Courts have
repeatedly upheld governmental quarantines of individuals where
there was evidence that the individual was infected, though these cases
tend to include a sovereign immunity element.113 Because being
infected is not criminal activity, it admittedly does not fit neatly within
the above definition of probable cause. But, in practice, government
109. Probable Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
110. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 366 (2003) (noting that probable cause “must be
particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized”).
111. See Probable Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (reasonable suspicion
that an individual “has committed” a past crime constitutes probable cause).
112. United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 94 (2006).
113. See, e.g., Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 596 (D.N.J. 2016) (upholding the forced
quarantine of a nurse suspected to be infected with Ebola because the judge “fail[ed] to see a lack
of probable cause so clear as to overcome the [state] officials’ qualified immunity”); Liberian
Ass’n of Conn. v. Lamont, 970 F.3d 174, 193 (2d Cir. 2020) (upholding a quarantine because there
was no clearly established case law cited by appellants in which in which “a court has invalidated
a quarantine order under the Fourth Amendment”).
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searches need not always be justified by criminal activity. For instance,
accidental house fires are non-criminal events, yet they certainly justify
“searches.”114 Accordingly, several circuit courts have adopted broader
definitions of probable cause to encompass non-criminal situations.115
Evidence that an individual is infected would almost certainly
include positive test results and could, depending on the circumstances,
include a display of symptoms. Additionally, probable cause might be
satisfied by evidence that an individual came into contact with an
infected individual, depending on the transmissibility of the disease.
VI. “REASONABLENESS”: THE FINAL HURDLE FOR IMPLEMENTING
QUARANTINE SURVEILLANCE
Under either the exigent circumstances doctrine or a warrant
program, probable cause is not enough: Courts are still empowered to
strike down any search that is “unreasonable.” This inquiry can be
broken down into two sets of considerations: “the degree to which [the
search] is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests,” and “the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy.”116
This inquiry, which can be conceptualized as a backstop to the
analysis in the prior sections, is virtually unbounded.117 This section
presents some judicial considerations that would likely be pivotal in
determining the constitutionality of quarantine surveillance.
A. Weighing the Governmental Interest in Stemming Disease Spread
The extent of the governmental interest in quarantine surveillance
is, in large part, a function of the danger posed by a given disease. For
instance, the common cold, COVID-19, and the Black Plague pose
different degrees of threats and therefore merit different governmental
114. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978) (holding that “[a] burning building clearly
presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry ‘reasonable’”).
115. Cantrell v. City of Murphy, 666 F.3d 911, 923 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[P]robable cause exists
where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge at the time of the seizure are
sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that an individual is mentally ill and poses a
substantial risk of serious harm.”); see also Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1997)
(“The Fourth Amendment requires an official seizing and detaining a person for psychiatric
evaluation to have probable cause to believe that the person is dangerous to himself or others.”).
116. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2176 (2016).
117. See id. at 2177–78 (weighing a number of factors in the balancing-of-interests analysis,
including the degree to which a search—a blood alcohol test—physically intruded on an
individual, the degree of intimate information captured in the test, the degree of embarrassment
and anxiety caused by the test, and the government’s interest in preventing drunk driving).
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responses. Quite clearly, a disease’s characteristics—including
deadliness and transmissibility—impact the government’s interest in
combatting that disease.
Time and location also likely influence this risk calculus. If a disease
is exceptionally dangerous, quarantine surveillance could be justified
when cases begin to emerge in the United States. But the governmental
interest may diminish as time passes and the threat begins to subside,
especially if vaccinations become widespread or herd immunity occurs.
Furthermore, courts will likely defer to government authorities on
the technical aspects of responding to an outbreak. Judges would be apt
to recognize the judiciary’s relative lack of institutional competence in
dealing with disease spread. And Jacobson’s deference to state
governments on health issues likely still holds some weight in the
Fourth Amendment analysis—though likely not enough to formally
alter the doctrinal test.118
Judges are also likely to take a more active role in policing civil
liberty violations the longer a disease lingers. In part, courts will
probably more intensely scrutinize government policies when time has
passed because scientific data about the disease and effective responses
should be more widely known and accessible to the courts. As a
practical matter, too, the government should be held to a higher
standard when acting on a more informed basis, as opposed to reacting
hurriedly when a disease first threatens U.S. citizens.
Additionally, the governmental interest in quarantine surveillance
is inherently tied to alternatives; if less-invasive means can adequately
address disease spread, then quarantine surveillance becomes less
reasonable. Mask mandates and vaccinations, for instance, might be
sufficiently effective. Furthermore, widely held freedom-loving
sentiments in the U.S. may prevent quarantines from being effective in
the first place.
B. Weighing the Privacy Intrusions of Quarantine Surveillance
To determine the degree to which a quarantine surveillance
program “intrudes upon an individual’s privacy,”119 courts are likely to
evaluate the extent of the location tracking and the length of time
during which an individual is surveilled. As discussed, quarantine
118. See supra Section II (discussing why Jacobson likely has some bearing, but not much, on
the issue of quarantine surveillance).
119. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2176.
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surveillance programs can track an individual’s every move over the
quarantine period, or, conceivably, limit the information gathered by
the government to the mere fact of exiting one’s designated quarantine
location.120 The latter would be less invasive and therefore more
reasonable.
Some courts may also place weight on the “castle doctrine,”121
which, as discussed, permits judges to heavily scrutinize searches of the
home. Quarantine surveillance that tracks individuals in and around
the home likely conflicts with this doctrine.
Finally, courts are likely to consider guardrails—measures the
government took, or could have taken, to decrease the intrusion on
privacy. One measure might be safeguards to prevent location data
hacking, especially from hostile foreign governments. Another privacypromoting measure might be supplemental legislation that limited how
the government could use location data or mandated a time by which
the government must delete the data.
CONCLUSION
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence disfavors en masse quarantine
surveillance. Courts would likely strike down sweeping quarantine
surveillance programs that tracked large swaths of individuals. But
courts might uphold programs that only targeted individuals for whom
the government established probable cause—including establishing
some form of individualized suspicion. This means the government,
before surveilling an individual, would likely have to obtain evidence
that the individual is infected with the disease or evidence that an
individual has violated or plans to violate a quarantine order. Even if
the government gathered this evidence, probable cause is likely a
minimum requirement; courts would likely retain vast discretion to
determine that a probable cause-backed surveillance program is
“unreasonable.”

120. See supra Section III (discussing the various forms that location tracking could take).
121. See supra Section II (discussing the castle doctrine and heightened judicial focus on
privacy rights in the home).

